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22 July 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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**CONTENTS**

1. Sino-Soviet Relations: Both parties will probably pursue their policies more vigorously following the close of the Sino-Soviet talks. (Page 1)
2. South Vietnam: A settlement of the differences between Diem and Buddhist leaders remains doubtful. (Page 3)
3. Syria-Arab Union: Syria is reported tense but quiet; Nasir may publicly abrogate Arab unity agreement. (Page 4)

25X1

25X1

6. Notes:  Haiti;  (Page 7)

25X1

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25X1

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## DAILY BRIEF

Sino-Soviet Relations: The brief and uninformative joint communiqué on the Sino-Soviet talks indicates that neither side is yet prepared to accept responsibility for splitting the Communist movement completely.

The best the two parties could agree on was to resume discussions at some unspecified future date. The recriminations exchanged in the press and the tactical maneuvering in the talks suggest that both parties will press their policies more vigorously.

With the end of the talks on 20 July, Khrushchev moved rapidly to consolidate Soviet bloc support for his position. Several Eastern European countries on 20 July issued commentaries on the Sino-Soviet talks. The similarity of their remarks suggests they were drafted on the basis of specific guidance from Moscow. The Chinese were harshly criticized for advocating thermonuclear war and for moving the dispute out of party-to-party relations and into the sphere of state relations.

On 20 July, Moscow announced there would be a meeting opening there on 24 July of first secretaries and government leaders of the member states of CEMA. This will be the first such meeting of Soviet bloc leaders since June 1962. The USSR undoubtedly will use the occasion to discuss Sino-Soviet relations, possibly

including the question of future economic relations with Communist China. A main subject of discussion will be Rumania's opposition to certain CEMA policies.

The USSR continues to make clear that its policies, especially those abhorred by the Chinese, remain firm. At a Kremlin reception on the afternoon of 20 July for visiting Hungarian leader Kadar, Khrushchev again expressed confidence that a limited nuclear test ban will be concluded.

Moscow also announced on 20 July the conclusion of an agreement with Belgrade to provide Yugoslavia technicians and assistance for the construction of certain industrial projects. This followed by 24 hours the USSR's announcement that Khrushchev would visit Yugoslavia in August.

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South Vietnam: A settlement of the differences between President Diem and Buddhist leaders is still doubtful.

Additional steps have been taken to placate the Buddhists, who rejected as inadequate Diem's 18 July statement easing regulations for the display of Buddhist flags and establishing a mechanism to handle specific Buddhist complaints. These steps include the release of about 300 persons arrested during last week's demonstrations in Saigon and the removal of barricades around Buddhist pagodas. The government has also invited Buddhist leaders to present their complaints to a special committee on 22 July.

The Buddhists are now insisting on the release of all persons detained since the initial uprising in Hué on 8 May or a clarification of their whereabouts, payment of indemnities to victims of the disorders, and the punishment of officials involved in repressions.

Despite a report that moderate Buddhist leaders have been encouraged by the government actions, the majority of the Buddhist leadership remains highly distrustful of government sincerity.

Tension has also been reported in the coastal city of Nha Trang, where some demonstrations have occurred, and in Hué, where large-scale army and police precautions have been noted.

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Syria - Arab Union: The continuing uneasiness of the Syrian regime is reflected in the severe curfew restrictions still in force and the heavy deployment of military units throughout Damascus.

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(The situation is reported to be tense but quiet. There has been no further shooting since 19 July. The military in some sections of Damascus is [redacted] [redacted] engaged in a house-to-house search for pro-Nasir elements suspected of being behind the unsuccessful coup attempt.)

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The Cairo press continues its campaign against the Syrian Baath party for its ruthless treatment of the plotters, and accuses the Syrian leaders of ruling "in unparalleled terrorism."

Meanwhile, the negotiations for Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi unity which were being held in Alexandria, Egypt, have apparently been broken off. The Syrian delegation, which refused to comment on the results of the talks, returned to Damascus on 19 July.

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(Nasir may use the occasion of his speech today--the anniversary eve of the 1952 Egyptian revolution--to launch an all-out verbal attack on the Baathist regimes in Baghdad and Damascus and to abrogate publicly the 17 April Egyptian-Iraqi-Syrian unity agreement.)

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**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

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NOTES

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\*Haiti: The Duvalier regime appears for the moment to have eliminated all effective internal opposition as the result of its success on 20 July in routing a small group of insurgents in the mountainous areas southeast of the capital. The group apparently consisted of only a handful of followers of slain opposition leader Clement Barbot who were determined to make a last-ditch stand. Earlier reports of a 19 July landing north of Port-au-Prince by Haitian exiles from the Bahamas are unconfirmed and appear to be unfounded.

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